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Abstract—While energy arbitrage from energy storage can
lower power system operating costs, it can also increase green-
house gas emissions. If power system operations are con-
ducted with the constraint that energy storage operation must
not increase emissions, how does this constraint affect en-
ergy storage investment decisions? Two bi-level energy stor-
age investment problems are considered, representing ‘philan-
thropic’ (profitability-constrained) and profit-maximizing storage
investors (PhSI, PMSI). A MILP heuristic is developed to obtain
good candidate solutions to these inherently MINLP bi-level
problems.
A case study is conducted on a 30% renewable system, with
sensitivity analyses on the price of storage and the price of carbon
emissions. Regardless of the emissions-neutrality constraint, a
PhSI installs significantly more energy storage than a PMSI,
increasing system flexibility. The effect of the emissions-neutrality
constraint in the absence of a carbon price is to reduce the
quantity of storage purchased and reduce annual system emis-
sions (~3%), with only minor increases in overall cost (~0.1%).
In cases with a carbon price, storage does not tend to increase
emissions and the emissions constraint does not tend to decrease
storage investment. The emissions-neutrality constraint is seen to
deliver similar emissions reductions even in a system with much
higher renewable penetration (46%).
Index Terms—Energy storage, power system emissions, power
system economics, storage expansion planning.
NOMENCLATURE
Sets and Indices
A Set of representative days, indexed by a.
B Set of transmission network buses, indexed by b.
I Set of generating units, indexed by i.
L Set of transmission lines, indexed by l.
S Set of generator power output blocks, indexed by s.
T Set of time intervals, indexed by t or τ .
Parameters
bi,s Marginal cost of block s of generator i ($/MWh).
Cmini Minimum cost of generator i ($/h).
Csui Start-up cost of generator i ($).
db,t,a Demand at bus b, time t, day a (MW).
Emax Regulator’s GHG emission target (tons).
Emini Minimum GHG emissions of generator i (tons/h).
Esui Start-up GHG emissions of generator i (tons).
fmaxl Capacity of transmission line l (MW).
gmaxi Maximum power output of generator i (MW).
gmini Minimum power output of generator i (MW).
gmaxi,s Maximum power output of block s, generator i (MW).
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gdowni Minimum down-time of generator i (h).
gupi Minimum up-time of generator i (h).
hi,s Marginal GHG emissions of block s, generator i
(tons/MWh).
mlinel,b Line connection map. m
line
lb = 1 if line l starts at bus
b, = −1 if line l ends in bus b, 0 otherwise.
muniti,b Unit map. m
unit
i,b = 1 if generator i is located at bus b,
0 otherwise.
PCO2 GHG emissions tax rate ($/ton-CO2e).
P load Load shed penalty ($/MWh).
P ren Renewable generation shed penalty ($/MWh).
wb,t Renewable generation at bus b, time t (MW).
xl Reactance of line l (Ω).
pia Probability of day a.
Primal Variables
Cgen System operator’s generation cost ($).
Cshed System operator’s shed cost ($).
Ea GHG Emissions for day a (tons).
Etotal Total GHG emissions (tons).
fl,t,a Power flow on line l, time t, day a (MW).
gi,t,a Power output of generator i, time t, day a (MW).
gi,s,t,a Power output of generator i, block s, time t, day a
(MW).
sloadb,t,a Load shed at bus b, time t, day a (MWh).
srenb,t,a Renewable generation shed at bus b, time t, day a
(MWh).
ui,t,a Binary variable for the commitment status of genera-
tor i, time t, day a.
vi,t,a Binary variable for the start-up of generator i, time t,
day a.
zi,t,a Binary variable for the shut-down of generator i, time
t, day a.
θb,t,a Voltage phase angle of bus b, time t, day a (rad).
Dual Variables
δi,s,t Dual variable for generator segment lower limit con-
straint.
δi,s,t Dual variable for generator segment upper limit con-
straint.
φ
i,t
Dual variable for renewable shedding lower limit
constraint.
φi,t Dual variable for renewable shedding upper limit
constraint.
κb,t Dual variable for storage state-of-charge tracking con-
straint.
ξ
b,t
Dual variable for storage state-of-charge lower limit
constraint.
ξb,t Dual variable for storage state-of-charge upper limit
constraint.
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b,t
Dual variable for storage charging power lower limit
constraint.
ρchgb,t Dual variable for storage charging power upper limit
constraint.
ρdis
b,t
Dual variable for storage discharging power lower
limit constraint.
ρdisb,t Dual variable for storage discharging power upper
limit constraint.
λb,t Dual variable for power balance constraint.
γ
l,t
Dual variable for line flow lower limit constraint.
γl,t Dual variable for line flow upper limit constraint.
βl,t Dual variable for DC power flow constraint.
α Dual variable for emissions constraint.
Variable Sets
ΩC Set of binary commitment variables.
ΩD Set of dispatch variables.
Ωλ Set of dual dispatch variables.
ΩS Set of storage investment variables.
I. INTRODUCTION
Increasing the penetration of renewable energy is a popular
solution to decarbonization of power systems; for example,
many jurisdictions have renewable portfolio standards, and
pricing of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions incentivizes more
installation of renewable generation. Renewable energy also
has the benefits of low operating cost and decreased reliance
on fuel imports which may come from politically volatile
regions. However, the most abundant sources of cost-effective
renewable energy–wind and solar photovoltaic–suffer from
uncertainty and variability in their power production. Grid-
scale energy storage is often seen as a promising solution for
the intermittency of renewable resources, and therefore a valu-
able contribution towards broader decarbonization efforts (in
combination with other approaches such as demand response).
Unfortunately, while storage can be used to reduce the carbon
intensity of power system operations, studies have shown that
under current market structures and generation mixes the use
of energy storage can increase overall GHG emissions.
This effect is primarily caused by the economic incentives
to charge storage at times when the marginal generator is
coal-fired (cheap, but carbon-intensive) and discharge at times
when the marginal generator is gas-fired (more expensive,
but less carbon-intensive). Although there are also economic
incentives to improve efficiency without fuel substitution, or to
charge using renewable generation which would otherwise be
spilled, the positive emissions impact of these incentives may
be outweighed by the negative emissions impact of gas-to-coal
fuel substitution. In the absence of a price on GHG emissions,
estimates of the overall impact of energy storage participation
include a range of 104-407 kg CO2 per MWh delivered
for grid-scale storage [1] and 75-270 kg/MWh for behind-
the-meter storage [2]. How to correct for these increases in
emissions is a topic of active consideration by regulators [3].
This paper investigates the impact of enforcing an
emissions-neutrality constraint (i.e. system emission with stor-
age participation shall not be greater than they would be
without storage) on the operation of power systems, investment
in grid-scale energy storage, and resulting power system
emissions.
The modeling of energy storage operation and its impact on
grid emissions has been studied using a wide variety of power
systems models and modes of energy storage participation;
consequently, findings on emissions impacts are varied as well.
Energy storage has been modeled as providing energy [1],
[4]–[11], reserves [12]–[14], or both energy and reserves [2],
[15]–[19]. Storage providing energy has been shown to be ca-
pable of increasing emissions [4]–[7], or can either increase or
decrease emissions depending on charge-scheduling heuristics
[8]–[10] and generation mixture [1], [9]–[11]. In [5], higher
penetrations of renewables amplify this emission-increasing
effect. Storage providing reserves has been shown to be
capable of increasing emissions [13], decreasing emissions
[12], or can either increase or decrease emissions depending
on reserve quantity, storage quantity, and reserve scheduling
rules [14]. Storage providing both energy and reserves has
been shown to be capable of increasing emissions [2], [19],
decreasing emissions [15]–[17], or can either increase or
decrease emissions depending on changing generation mixes
[18]. In [19], emissions are increased even in the presence of
a 30 e/ton price on GHG emissions, although increasing wind
penetration mitigates this effect.
When modeling storage’s participation in power systems,
many studies have treated the system’s marginal emissions rate
as fixed, and determined exogenously [1], [2], [6]–[8], [10]–
[12]. This may be a reasonable approximation for small-scale
energy storage, but larger quantities of energy storage will
have the ability to change the marginal unit(s) of generation.
More sophisticated approaches use an economic dispatch
model [5], [9], [14] or a unit commitment [4], [13], [15]–[19].
Inclusions of the transmission network as in [4], [13]–[16] is
also significant, as locationality affects storage operations in a
transmission-constrained system.
Overall, the literature has mixed results on the overall emis-
sions impact of energy storage. Identified factors which may
influence whether energy storage is beneficial or detrimental
from an emissions perspective include: charging/discharging
strategies [8]–[10], generation mixture [1], [9]–[11], [18],
reserve scheduling rules, [14], and the quantity of storage
installed [14]. Beyond the relevant ‘system’ parameters, the
direction of the emissions impact may also be determined by
the particular day(s) under consideration, since the shape of
the net load profile will determine the economic opportunities
available to energy storage operators.
Previous work has investigated the emissions impact of stor-
age participating in a market environment, but hasn’t looked
at how a daily emissions-neutrality constraint can impact
storage investment decisions and resulting emissions. Lin et al.
[14] introduces an emissions-neutrality constraint for storage
providing reserves, but only considers single-period economic
dispatch, and do not assess the impact on storage profitability.
Several papers have investigated storage expansion planning
for low-carbon emissions goals [20]–[22], but they do not
address the emissions impact of adding storage to current
market environments or storage profitability. A comprehensive
3review of storage expansion planning for low-carbon power
systems is given in [23].
By contrast, this paper investigates the impact of an
emissions-neutrality constraint (ENC) on the profitability of
various quantities of storage, and therefore the optimal quan-
tity of storage to invest in, and finally the resulting GHG
emissions impact.
Although prices on carbon emissions are typically consid-
ered to be the most efficient mechanisms to reduce emission
quantity, in many places they are politically infeasible, or
are set at quantities which are considered too low to achieve
substantive reductions in GHG emissions [24]. Despite their
relative inefficiency, alternative policy measures to reduce
GHG emissions are often implemented instead.
Profitability is assessed from two merchant storage per-
spectives: a profit-maximizing storage investor (PMSI) or a
‘philanthropic’ investor (PhSI) who only requires a specified
minimum return on investment to cover installation costs.
An example of an entity which may want to participate
as a philanthropic storage investor would be a government
with an interest in reducing costs and/or emissions from the
power system in its jurisdiction while still participating in a
competitive energy market with existing generation compa-
nies. Alternatively, a philanthropic emissions-neutral storage
investor may be a public-private partnership; a governmental
organization may offer low-cost financing, tax incentives, or
other cost-reducing measure to a private storage investor in
exchange for a commitment to offer storage dispatch control
to the system operator with an ENC. These merchant energy
storage perspectives are compared with a vertically-integrated
utility (VIU) perspective, concerned only with overall costs
and not storage profitability.
Though investments in energy storage by a system operator
or a PMSI have reciprocal impacts on profitability [25], in
this framework we look at just one or the other in order to
more clearly see the impact of the ENC. Although storage may
earn revenue by participating in reserves, including reserves in
power systems modeling introduces sensitivity to required re-
serves quantity and scheduling rules [14]. Therefore, reserves
are omitted in order to focus on how an ENC impacts a system
where energy participation can increase emissions.
The specific contributions of this paper are:
• The formulation of two bi-level models (‘philanthropic’
and ‘profit-maximizing’) to optimize merchant storage
investments in light of emissions-neutrality constraints in
commitment and dispatch.
• Development of a heuristic to quickly obtain good feasi-
ble solutions to this inherently non-convex and computa-
tionally difficult problem.
• Analysis of solution quality of the ‘philanthropic’ prob-
lem using a relaxation that allows the evaluation of
solution quality with reduced computational burden.
• Demonstration of these methods on a detailed case study.
• Sensitivity analysis showing the effect of governmental
incentives or taxes on the optimal quantity of energy
storage and the resulting operational impacts.
II. POWER SYSTEM MODEL
A transmission-constrained unit commitment formulation is
used to model a system operator’s choice of online generators,
the dispatch quantities of generators and energy storage, and
the resulting prices.
The model implicitly assumes an adequately competitive
electricity market, in which a centralized operator clears bids
from generators and storage operators that accurately represent
their true capacities and costs. The results in an adequately
competitive bilateral market should be broadly similar, with
the structural difference that the emissions-neutrality constraint
would be enforced on the storage operator’s purchases and
sales. This system operation formulation is embedded into
a multi-level optimization model used by an energy storage
investor to decide the quantities and locations to install storage.
A. System Operational Constraints
Operational constraints for the system operator’s unit com-
mitment problem are given in (1)-(13). The constraints in this
section apply for each representative day a ∈ A, however the
index a is omitted for brevity. Dual variables for each dispatch
constraint are given in parentheses to the right of the equation.
vi,t − zi,t = ui,t − ui,t−1 ; ∀i ∈ I, t ∈ T (1)
t∑
τ=t−gupi +1
vi,τ ≤ ui,t ; ∀t ∈ T, i ∈ I (2)
t∑
τ=t−gdowni +1
zi,τ ≤ 1− ui,t ; ∀t ∈ T, i ∈ I (3)
0 ≤ gi,s,t ≤ gmaxi,s ui,t ∀i ∈ I, s ∈ S, t ∈ T
(
δ, δ
)
(4)
0 ≤ srenb,t ≤ wb,t
(
φ, φ
)
(5)
Qb,t = Qb,t−1 + ηJ
chg
b,t −
1
η
Jdisb,t ∀b ∈ B, t ∈ T (κ) (6)
0 ≤ Qb,t ≤ Qmaxb ∀b ∈ B, t ∈ T
(
ξ, ξ
)
(7)
0 ≤ J chgb,t ≤ Jmaxb ∀b ∈ B, t ∈ T
(
ρchg, ρchg
)
(8)
0 ≤ Jdisb,t ≤ Jmaxb ∀b ∈ B, t ∈ T
(
ρdis, ρdis
)
(9)∑
i∈I
muniti,b gi,t + J
dis
b,t −
∑
l∈L
mlinel,b fl,t + wb,t − srenb,t =
db,t + J
chg
b,t ; ∀b ∈ B, t ∈ T (λ) (10)
fl,t = yl
∑
b∈B
mlinel,b θb,t ; ∀l ∈ L, t ∈ T (β) (11)
−fmaxl ≤ fl,t ≤ fmaxl ; ∀l ∈ L, t ∈ T
(
γ, γ
)
(12)
Etotal ≤ χEbaseline (α) (13)
gi,t := g
min
i ui,t +
∑
s∈S
gi,s,t ; ∀i ∈ I, t ∈ T
Etotal :=
∑
i∈I
∑
t∈T
(
Emini ui,t + E
su
i vi,t +
∑
s∈S
hi,sgi,s,t
)
Eqs. (1)-(3) constrain the generator commitment variables.
Eq. (1) relates status, startup, and shutdown variables (ui,t,
vi,t, zi,t, respectively). Eq. (2) ensures that minimum up-times
are respected, while (3) ensures that minimum down-times
4are respected. Generator heat rate curves are represented by
piecewise-linear segments. Eq. (4) constrains the power in
each segment gi,s,t to its segment capacity limit gmaxi,s . Renew-
able spillage srenb,t is constrained in (5) to be non-negative and
not more than the maximum renewable generation available
wb,t. Energy storage charging J
chg
b,t and discharging J
dis
b,t are
constrained in (6)-(9), where (6) tracks the state-of-charge of
energy storage Qb,t, (7) constrains the state-of-charge based
on energy capacity Qmaxb , and (8)-(9) constrain charging and
discharging based on power capacity Jmaxb . Storage charge and
discharge efficiency are given by η. The transmission network
is represented by the DC power flow model in (10)-(12). Net-
work topology is defined by matrices muniti,b for generators and
mlinel,b for transmission lines. Eq. (10) ensures power balance at
each node in the network, (11) relates flows fl,t to bus angles
θb,t via line admittances yl, and (12) constrains each line’s
power flow to its maximum magnitude fmaxl . Finally, (13)
represents the emissions-neutrality constraint (ENC), ensuring
that GHG emissions Etotal (based on generator emissions at
minimum power Emini , startup emissions E
su
i , and marginal
emissions rates hi,s) are not increased, relative to the emissions
of the baseline (no-storage) solution Ebaseline. These emissions
rates may already be measured by existing air-quality regula-
tions, and therefore available to the system operator [26]. To
solve with a non-binding ENC, the value of χ is set to a large
constant.
B. System Operator’s Problem
The goal of the system operator is to minimize the total
cost of supplying the demand of the system Cgen (based on
generator cost at minimum power Cmini , startup costs C
su
i , and
marginal costs bi,s), subject to the operational constraints; this
problem is formalized in (14)-(15).
min
ΩC,ΩD
Cgen (14)
Cgen :=
∑
t∈T
∑
i∈I
(
Cmini ui,t + C
su
i vi,t +
∑
s∈S
bi,sgi,s,t
)
subject to:
Eqs. (1)-(13) (15)
III. INVESTMENT MODELS
The question of how much storage is ‘optimal’ to install
depends on the perspective taken. The simplest case is for
a vertically-integrated utility (VIU), whose only objective is
minimizing overall social cost. This perspective is simplest
as decisions on storage investment ΩS, generator commitment
ΩC, and dispatch ΩD are conducted simultaneously. This
perspective is formalized in (16)-(18).
The parameter pia represents the frequency of each represen-
tative day, while storage investment costs are determined by
the amoritized per-MWh storage energy cost cQ and per-MW
storage power cost cJ for a given storage quantity. Although
real costs for energy storage projects are not generally linear,
a sub-linear relationship would be inherently non-convex and
therefore complicate the optimization process. A linear model
is consistent with projects with fixed project costs plus linear
costs for capacity, with solutions differing only for small
quantities of storage where the capacity costs do not dominate.
min
ΩC,ΩD,ΩS
Cbatt +
∑
a∈A
piaC
gen
a (16)
subject to:
Eqs. (1)-(13) (17)
Cbatt :=
∑
b∈B
(
cQQmaxb + c
JJmaxb
)
(18)
This is contrasted with a centralized power market structure,
in which a storage investor earns revenue based on locational
marginal prices (LMPs), obtained from the commitment and
dispatch solution determined by the system operator. A stor-
age owner’s net profit is determined by LMPs λb,t,a, power
dispatch, and storage investment costs Cbatt, as in (19).
Profit :=
∑
a∈A
[
pia
∑
b∈B
∑
t∈T
λb,t,a
(
Jdisb,t,a − J chgb,t,a
)]
− Cbatt
(19)
A purely self-interested storage investor would have the
sole objective of choosing storage investments to maximize
their net profit, while LMPs are determined by a lower-level
system operator determining unit commitment and dispatch.
This perspective is formalized in (20)-(21), and is referred to
as the profit-maximizing storage investor (PMSI). Although
owners of large geographically-dispersed storage installations
may coordinate bids to maximize their energy-market profit
[27], the PMSI formulation assumes that once the storage
investments are made, the energy market is competitive enough
to be modeled with a cost-minimization problem.
max
ΩS
Profit (20)
subject to:
λ ∈ arg min
ΩC,ΩD
{
Cgen; subject to: Eqs. (1)-(13)
}
(21)
By contrast, there may be a storage investor who is less
concerned with maximizing net profit than with lowering the
overall social cost, subject to the constraint that enough energy
market revenue is collected to cover the annualized investment
cost [28]. We refer to this perspective as a ‘philanthropic’ stor-
age investor (PhSI). Entities which may take this perspective
include governmental or not-for-profit entities participating in
a competitive energy market. This perspective is formalized in
(22)-(24). Both the PMSI and PhSI are bi-level optimization
problems, and are illustrated in Fig. 1.
min
ΩS
Cbatt +
∑
a∈A
piaC
gen
a (22)
subject to:
Profit ≥ 0 (23)
Cgen,λ ∈ arg min
ΩC,ΩD
{
Cgen; subject to: Eqs. (1)-(13)
}
(24)
5Maximize net storage profit
Subject to:
Profit from lower level
Minimize system operation cost
Subject to:
Operational constraints
Emissions constraint
Storage 
investments LMPs
(a)
Minimize storage + operational costs
Subject to:
Profit constraint
Profit from lower level
Operational costs from lower level
Minimize system operation cost
Subject to:
Operational constraints
Emissions constraint
(b)
Storage 
investments LMPs
Fig. 1. Bi-level formulations of merchant energy storage: (a) a profit-
maximizing storage investor, (b) a ‘philanthropic’ storage investor.
IV. SOLUTION METHODS
Solving the VIU perspective is a relatively straightforward
MILP problem, since all decisions are made in a single level.
However, the inclusion of energy market profit in the bi-
level models complicates the solution process, since storage
investment decisions influence energy market prices and en-
ergy market prices influence storage investment decisions. Bi-
level optimization problems are inherently non-convex and
NP-hard, even with a linear lower level [29]; problems where
the lower level is non-convex (e.g. unit commitment) are even
more challenging. For the purpose of this paper, we develop an
iterative heuristic (Alg. 1) in order to determine good candidate
solutions to both bi-level problems in a reasonable amount
of time. This algorithm is repeated for each combination of
carbon price and effective storage price (described further in
Section V). The quality of these solutions is evaluated in
Section IV-A.
All storage quantities q between zero and the optimal VIU
quantity qmax are evaluated, and the resulting net storage profit
and social cost for each quantity are evaluated once the unit
commitment is solved. Finally, the profitable storage quantity
with lowest social cost is chosen as the best candidate for the
PhSI case, and the storage quantity with greatest net profit is
chosen as the best candidate for the PMSI case.
Algorithm 1 Heuristic solution algorithm
1: DEFINE(VIU model, Lower-level model)
2: qmax ←∞ . q is the system’s total storage quanta
3: SOLVE(VIU model)
4: RECORD(q, NetStorageProfit, SocialCost)
5: qmax ← (q − 1)
6: for i← 1 to qmax do
7: FIX(q = i)
8: SOLVE(Lower-level model)
9: RECORD(q, NetStorageProfit, SocialCost)
10: end for
11: qphilanthropic ←SELECT(q)
q ∈ {argmin SocialCost(q),NetStorageProfit(q) ≥ 0}
12: qprofit-max ←SELECT(q | q ∈ argmax NetStorageProfit(q))
A. Assessing Solution Quality
As the PhSI and PMSI problems are inherently non-linear
and non-convex, evaluating the quality of candidate solutions
(relative to a global lower bound) is not straightforward.
However, there are two MILP relaxations of the PhSI problem,
which can be used to find an upper bound for the optimal-
ity gap of candidate solutions. The first is the simply the
VIU, since the profit constraint and the lower-level optimality
constraint are both relaxed. The second relaxes the lower-
level optimality constraint on the unit commitment variables
to create a formulation which can be transformed into a profit-
constrained single-level equivalent (PCSLE). The derivation of
the PCSLE follows the approach of [28], and is summarized
in Appendix A.
For the PMSI problem, obtaining a good estimate for the
optimality gap is challenging. The same approach of relaxing
the lower-level optimality constraint on the unit commit-
ment variables would also yield a formulation which can be
transformed into a single-level equivalent, but the relaxation
would be significantly looser. This is because the upper-level
objective is to maximize storage profit, so the relaxation will
tend to choose uneconomic commitments which would never
be chosen by a system operator, and therefore the upper bound
on profit found by the relaxation will be very high. Instead, we
evaluate local optimality by iteratively perturbing the heurtistic
solution by one unit of storage at each bus, and ensuring that
none of these alternative storage solutions produces a higher
net profit.
B. Limitations of the PCSLE
Although the MILP approximation of the original bi-level
problem provides a relaxation which can assess the quality of
the heuristic-found solutions, this formulation is not without
its drawbacks: first and foremost is computational tractability.
As mentioned in Section IV, single-level equivalents of bi-
level problems are inherently NP-hard. In practice, solving
problems with big-M approximations can be challenging, as
the values of M must be large enough to capture the full
range of the continuous variables, but values which are too
large cause difficulties for MILP solvers.
Second, as the MILP formulation is a relaxation, it may
include integral solutions which are cheaper than the heuristic-
found solution, but are not valid solutions to the original bi-
level problem. A storage quantity which is not found to be
profitable in the original bi-level problem may be profitable in
this single-level relaxation, since unit commitment variables
are no longer constrained to be part of the minimum-cost
solution of the original lower-level problem. In essence, the
single-level equivalent assumes that all decisions (storage
quantity, unit commitments) are made simultaneously, and so
a storage quantity which would lower total costs but otherwise
be unprofitable can be made profitable by selection of a
sub-optimal unit commitment solution. Therefore, the true
optimum of the original bi-level problem may be greater than
than the best lower-bound found by the single-level equivalent,
and therefore the optimality gap for a given heuristic-found
solution can only overestimate the true optimality gap.
V. CASE STUDY
A case study is conducted using the Reliability Test System
of the Grid Modernization Laboratory Consortium (RTS-
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Fig. 2. Optimal storage power as a function of investment perspective and emissions constraint. Rows: emissions unconstrained (a), (b), (c); emissions
constrained (d), (e), (f); emissions constraint impact (g), (h), (i). Columns: vertically-integrated utility (a), (d), (g); philanthropic storage investor (b), (e), (h),
profit-maximizing storage investor (c), (f), (i).
GMLC) [30]. The RTS-GMLC is based on the 1996 IEEE
Reliability Test System, with an updated generation fleet,
emissions curves for all fossil-fuel generators, the addition of
renewable generation, and 365 days of hourly profiles for load
and renewable generation. This system has a high penetration
of renewables: over the course of the year, hydro represents
10.8% of total energy demand, utility-scale solar PV 10.0%,
rooftop PV 5.7%, and wind 19.0%.
To obtain a ‘base case’ system that is more representative
of renewable penetrations in current high-renewables systems
(or what will likely be encountered in the near future as
penetration increases in lower-penetration systems), renewable
sources were scaled down proportionally to a penetration of
30%, measured on an annual energy basis. This renewable
penetration is similar to that of the Irish grid at 33% [31],
notable for having the highest renewable penetration of large
systems not within a larger synchronous AC network. The
original RTS-GMLC renewable penetration (46% by energy)
is run as a ‘higher renewables’ case.
For the planning problem, a set of five representative days
is developed by using a k-means clustering algorithm on
the 365 daily profiles, after their dimension was reduced
by principal component analysis [32]: 95% of variance is
captured via 13 principal components. When transforming the
representative days back to full dimension, negative values of
load or renewable generation are clipped to 0. Multi-period
constraints in the system operator’s problem (i.e. (1)-(3), (6))
are enforced cyclically; initial conditions are not assumed a
priori, but assumed to reflect the end of the current day [33],
and the net load in the first and last hours of the day are
smoothed to avoid introducing unrealistic midnight ramps.
Dimensionality of the storage investment problem is re-
duced by fixing the storage power and energy ratios at a 4-hour
duration, and by limiting storage investment to 10 candidate
buses (out of the original 72); these candidate buses were
selected by collecting a pool of candidate solutions to the VIU
planning problem, and selecting all buses which had storage
investment in any candidate solution.
To investigate the impact of price parameters on optimal
storage quantities and the resulting emissions rates, a sensi-
tivity analysis is conducted. Carbon prices of 0-100 $/ton are
tested in $10/ton steps, and effective storage prices of 25,000-
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Fig. 3. Optimal storage power with and without emissions-neutrality constraint, for a) vertically-integrated utility, b) philanthropic storage investor, and c)
profit-maximizing storage investor.
60,000 $/MW-year are tested in $2,500/MW-year steps. The
effective storage price is an amortized value which depends
on the capital cost of storage, equipment lifetime, financing
rates, and presence of regulatory incentives.
Optimization problems were modeled using GAMS 25.0
and solved using CPLEX 12.8, on machines with at least
16 cores and 64 GB of RAM. Each storage siting and unit
commitment problem was solved to an optimality gap of
0.1% or better, and the heuristic algorithm optimizing both
storage sizing and siting typically completed within 4 hours.
As the heuristic features many independent storage siting
optimizations, this time could further be reduced by running
these optimizations in parallel.
VI. RESULTS
A. Storage Quantity
Fig. 2 shows the optimal storage quantities found by a
vertically integrated utility, a philanthropic storage investor,
and a profit-maximizing storage investor, with sensitivity to
both the effective price of energy storage (amoritized, per
MW) and the price of carbon emissions. The first row shows
the storage quantity without the emissions-neutrality constraint
(ENC), the second row shows the storage quantity with the
ENC, and the third row shows the difference from the ENC.
Decreasing storage prices and increasing carbon price quan-
tities both tend to increase the optimal storage quantity, for
all perspectives, both with and without an ENC. On average,
the PhSI installs nearly as much storage as the VIU (93.3%
without the ENC, 91.8% with the ENC), but the PMSI installs
significantly less (67.5% without the ENC, 70.7% with the
ENC). The effect of the ENC when there is no price on
carbon is to reduce storage quantities in all three investment
perspectives; on average the VIU selects 105 MW less storage,
the PhSI selects 104 MW less, and the PMSI selects 45 MW
less. However, the ENC also results in a significant decrease
in emissions in these cases, as will be discussed in Section
VI-B.
The impact of the ENC on the optimal storage quantity
selected by each type of investor is highly variable, especially
in the PMSI perspective, as shown in Fig. 3. This variance is
due to underlying nonconvexities of the optimization problem
structures; all three investment perspectives feature discrete
storage quantities and unit commitment variables, and solu-
tions to these types of problems can be sensitive to changes in
parameter values or new constraints. Additionally, since MIP
models are typically solved to a specified optimality gap rather
than global optimality, solvers may return solutions with sim-
ilar objective function values but which differ sharply in their
other decision variable values [34]. Finally, the PMSI problem
features arbitrage profit in its objective function, which is
especially sensitive to changes in commitment solutions. The
variance caused by these factors highlights the importance
of conducting sensitivity analyses, to draw conclusions from
repeated sampling rather than single point estimates.
Since the storage power solutions found in this case study
are not normally distributed, non-parametric statistical meth-
ods must be used to draw conclusions in light of this high
variance. The Wilcoxon signed-rank test is a non-parametric
procedure which can be used to assess whether the means of
a set of paired samples differ [35]; in this case, the installed
storage quantities with and without the ENC are assessed to
determine whether the null hypothesis that the means are the
same can be rejected. Since there are several observations
where the difference between the storage quantities is exactly
zero, the procedure is adjusted as in [36].
When there is a nonzero price on carbon, there is no
statistically significant difference in storage quantity for either
the VIU or PhSI perspective (p = 0.90 and p = 0.10,
respectively), while for the PMSI perspective there is a statis-
tically significant but modest increase in the optimal storage
quantity (p = 0.0095, average increase of 17.5 MW). This
seemingly counter-intuitive result is due to the fact that storage
dispatch and generator commitment/dispatch are considered
simultaneously, so the emissions constraint applies to the unit
commitment variables which, once fixed, define the time- and
location-varying generator supply curves. The optimal storage
quantity is ultimately a function of these supply curves, and in
these case studies the ENC seems to result in supply curves
which offer maximum PMSI profitability at greater storage
quantities.
Overall, the effect of the ENC on storage quantity appears
to be much weaker than the effects of the storage price,
the carbon price, and the variance associated with re-solving
mixed-integer linear programs with perturbed parameters.
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Fig. 4. Emissions impact from storage as a function of investment perspective and emissions constraint. Rows: emissions unconstrained (a), (b), (c); emissions
constrained (d), (e), (f); emissions constraint impact (g), (h), (i). Columns: vertically-integrated utility (a), (d), (g); philanthropic storage investor (b), (e), (h),
profit-maximizing storage investor (c), (f), (i).
B. Emissions Quantity
Fig. 4 shows the emissions impact of the storage quantities
shown in Fig. 2. Although the emissions impact of storage is
seen to be beneficial (reducing annual emissions) when there is
a carbon price, in the absence of a carbon price the impact of
adding storage is to increase emissions, as shown in Figs. 4(a),
4(b), and 4(c). Emissions are increased by an average of 2.3%
for the VIU perspective, 3.1% for the PhSI perspective, and
2.5% for the PMSI perspective. On average, renewable spillage
is reduced by 81%, but this beneficial effect is outweighed by
a 7% increase in energy generated from coal, coupled with a
10% decrease in energy generated from natural gas.
The impact of the ENC is to significantly reduce the system
emissions in cases without a carbon price (on average 2.9%
for the VIU, 3.4% for the PhSI, 2.6% for the PMSI), to below
the emissions baseline (no-storage) while having little effect
on the emissions in cases with a carbon price, as shown in
Figs. 4(g), 4(h), and 4(i) (The only perspective which saw
a statistically significant result in the presence of a carbon
price was the PMSI, with an average emissions reduction of
0.2%). Emissions reductions in the cases without a carbon
price were achieved with only minor cost increases: on average
0.11% for the VIU, 0.09% for the PhSI, 0.05% for PMSI, and
no statistically significant change in the priced GHG cases
(p > 0.9 in the Wilcoxon test).
Although seemingly counter-intuitive, enforcement of the
ENC on a daily basis can sometimes tend to increase overall
emissions, as seen in Figs. 4(g), 4(h), and 4(i). In the absence
of an ENC, there may be certain days of the year where
storage tends to increase emissions and certain days where
it tends to decrease emissions, based on the particular profiles
of electricity demand and renewable generation. When the
ENC binds on the emissions-increasing days, and lowers the
economic value of energy storage, the optimal quantity of
storage to invest in may change. The net impact of this change
in storage quantity may be negative if the beneficial effect on
the ENC in emissions-increasing days is outweighed by the
detrimental effect on emissions-decreasing days (i.e., the new
storage quantity is not as effective at decreasing emissions on
those days).
The quality of the PhSI solutions can be evaluated by
investigating the lower bound of the two relaxations described
9in Section IV-A. The solutions found by the heuristic in
Algorithm 1 are typically within 0.1% of the best lower bound
found by the VIU relaxation. Although the PCSLE formulation
is a tighter relaxation of the PhSI problem, in practice the
progress of the best lower-bound is relatively slow; the best
lower bound found by the PCSLE formulation after 24 hours
is still below the best lower bound of the VIU, which typically
solves to 0 optimality gap within one hour.
C. Higher Renewables Case
When the methods are applied to the original RTS-GMLC
test system with 46% penetration of renewables by energy,
the results are broadly similar, but with a few differences.
In the higher renewables case the addition of energy storage
reduces the average system emissions, even without a price
on carbon: by 1.0% in the VIU perspective, 0.5% in the PhSI
perspective, and by 0.4% in the PMSI perspective. This is
consistent with the results from [18], which shows that the
negative emissions effects from storage become positive as
power systems increase their penetrations of low- and no-
carbon generation sources.
However, there are still some days for which storage in-
creases emissions, so the addition of the ENC still has an
effect on the operation of these days and the optimal storage
quantity: the ENC reduces emissions by 2.6% for the VIU,
3.1% for the PhSI, and 3.0% for the PMSI. Notably, these
reductions are similar in magnitude to the emissions reductions
observed in the case with 30% renewables, implying that
although the average effect of storage on emissions may be
better in higher-renewables cases, the beneficial impact of the
ENC may remain relatively constant. The increase in total
cost is modest: 0.12% in the VIU case, 0.14% in the PhSI
case, and 0.19% in the PMSI case. When there is a price on
carbon, there is no statistically significant difference in cost or
emissions in any of the investment perspectives (p > 0.4).
In all investment perspectives, the optimization prioritizes
installing storage first at bus 309 (downstream of congested
line C6), due to the economic opportunities that this conges-
tion presents. This is contrasted with the 30% penetration ‘base
case’, which does not exhibit congestion in any of the five
representative days (although it is present at this line on some
days when the number of representative days is expanded from
five to ten).
VII. CONCLUSION
The addition of energy storage to power systems operating
without a price on carbon can increase system emissions, even
in systems with high penetrations of renewables (30% in this
case study). Even in a system with much higher penetration
(46% in the ‘higher renewables’ case), the impact may be on
average only minorly beneficial, as storage tends to increase
emissions in some days and decrease it in others. This effect
persists over a wide range of energy storage prices, suggesting
that policies which subsidize energy storage installation may
not result in lowered emissions, absent complementary policies
governing storage operation.
If pricing GHG emissions is not feasible (e.g. due to
political obstacles), then adding an emissions-neutrality con-
straint to the operation of energy storage is shown to have
a significant beneficial effect on system emissions (approxi-
mately 3%, depending on the storage investment perspective),
with only a minor impact on overall cost (approximately
0.1-0.2%, depending on the storage investment perspective
and the penetration of renewables). A ‘philanthropic’ (profit-
constrained) storage investor tends to invest in significantly
more energy storage than a profit-maximizing storage investor,
illustrating the benefits that a socially-minded storage invest-
ment entity can provide, even in the presence of profitability
and emissions-neutrality constraints.
While these effects have been shown in this particular
case study, future work can examine the sensitivity of these
results to more general cases. Factors which may contribute
to different outcomes in terms of storage investment and
emissions may include:
• differences in market design, such as participation of
energy storage in the reserves market(s),
• varying total penetrations of non-emitting resources, or
varying ratios of solar, wind, and nuclear generation, and
• consideration of different storage durations, or of invest-
ment in a mixture of storage with varying durations.
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APPENDIX A: DUAL PROBLEM OF TRANSMISSION
CONSTRAINED ECONOMIC DISPATCH
A. Creating a Profit-Constrained Single-Level Equivalent
Though the PhSI objective (22) and operational constraints
(1)-(13) can be formulated as a single-level MILP problem, the
profit definition (19) contains both primal and dual decision
variables; therefore, these variables must be optimized simul-
taneously. The system operator’s unit commitment problem
is necessarily non-convex due to binary commitment vari-
ables; strong duality does not in general hold for non-convex
problems. However, if the binary variables and constraints
are moved to the upper-level of the bi-level formulations de-
scribed in Section IV, the lower level becomes a transmission-
constrained economic dispatch (TCED) problem, which can be
represented linearly using the DC power flow approximation.
A linear (and therefore convex) lower-level problem can be
replaced by a series of constraints in an upper-level problem,
creating a single-level equivalent of the profit-constrained
storage investment problem [28].
Moving the binary variables and constraints from the lower-
level to the upper-level represents a relaxation of the original
bi-level problem, since the values of the binary variables are no
longer constrained by the lower-level unit commitment prob-
lem, and no additional constraints are introduced. Therefore,
the best lower bound on the relaxed problem provides a lower
bound for the best value of the original PhSI problem.
Since the original TCED problem is linear, strong duality
is guaranteed, so the value of the primal and dual objective
functions are equal for a set of primal and dual variables
(Ωλ) that are primal and dual optimal, respectively. The dual
problem of the TCED is given in (25)-(32), with the primal
variables to which each dual constraint corresponds listed
in parentheses. The strong duality constraint for the TCED
problem is given in (33). Although this single-level equivalent
contains bi-linear terms, Section A.2 demonstrates how a
MILP approximation can be obtained, which can provide a
lower-bound on the optimum.
max
ΩD
Cˆdual := α
[∑
t∈T
∑
i∈I
Emini ui,t + E
su
i vi,t − χEbaseline
]
−
∑
l∈L
∑
t∈T
[
fmaxl
(
γ
l,t
+ γl,t
)]
−
∑
i∈I
∑
s∈S
∑
t∈T
gmaxi,s ui,tδi,s,t
+
∑
b∈B
∑
t∈T
[
λb,t
(
db,t − wb,t −
∑
i∈I
muniti,b g
min
i ui,t
)
−Qmaxb ξb,t − Jmaxb
(
ρchgb,t + ρ
dis
b,t
)
− wb,tφb,t
]
(25)
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subject to:
αhi,s + bi,s −
∑
b∈B
[
muniti,b λb,t
]− δi,s,t + δi,s,t = 0 (gi,s,t)
(26)
1
ηdis
κb,t + ρ
dis
b,t − ρdisb,t − λb,t = 0
(
Jdisb,t
)
(27)
λb,t + ρ
chg
b,t − ρchgb,t − ηchgκb,t = 0
(
J chgb,t
)
(28)∑
l∈L
ylm
line
l,b βl,t = 0 (θb,t) (29)∑
b∈B
(
mlinel,b λb,t
)
+ βl,t − γl,t + γl,t = 0 (fl,t) (30)
κb,t − κb,t+1 + ξb,t − ξb,t = 0 (Qb,t) (31)
λb,t + φb,t − φb,t = 0
(
srenb,t
)
(32)
α, γ, δ, ζ, ξ, ρ, φ ≥ 0
Cˆdual = Cˆprimal :=
∑
i∈I
∑
s∈S
∑
t∈T
bi,sgi,s,t (33)
Therefore, the profit-constrained single-level equivalent of
the relaxed PhSI problem is given by the original objective
function (34), the upper-level profit constraint (35), unit com-
mitment constraints (36), and lower-level constraints (37)-(39).
min
ΩC,ΩD,ΩS,Ωλ
Cbatt +
∑
a∈A
Cgena (34)
subject to:
Equation (23) (35)
Equations (1)-(3) ∀a ∈ A (36)
Equations (4)-(13) ∀a ∈ A (37)
Equation (33) ∀a ∈ A (38)
Equations (26)-(32) ∀a ∈ A (39)
B. Creating a MILP Approximation
The profit-constrained single-level equivalent presented in
(34)-(39) contains several non-linear terms. The profit defini-
tion (19) contains the product of continuous lower-level dual
variables (λ) and primal variables (J chg,Jdis), while the strong
duality constraint contains products of continuous lower-level
dual variables and upper-level binary and continuous variables.
First, the profit constraint can be converted from a product of
lower-level primal and dual variables to a product of lower-
level dual and upper-level variables using complementary
slackness conditions, as shown in (40) [28].
∑
b∈B
∑
t∈T
λb,t,a
(
Jdisb,t,a − J chgb,t,a
)
=∑
b∈B
∑
t∈T
[
Qmaxb ξb,t + J
max
b
(
ρdisb,t + ρ
chg
b,t
) ]
(40)
Next, the continuous upper-level variables Qmaxb and J
max
b
can be approximated by integer variables representing discrete
storage quantities. These integer variables can be equivalently
represented by a summation of binary variables in order to
convert the products of integer and continuous variables to
the products of binary and continuous variables. A binary
expansion is used in (41)-(42) to reduce dimensionality as
compared to a unary expansion. Although the representation
of integer variables by a binary expansion is not in general
more efficient than an integer representation [37], this allows
the use of the big-M method, and has been shown to be more
effective than non-linear solvers or the use of McCormick
envelopes in solving bi-linear problems containing the product
of continuous and integer variables in constraints [38].
Qmaxb ≈
∑
n
2nxab,n∆Q (41)
Jmaxb ≈
∑
n
2nxbb,n∆J (42)
After discretization and binary expansions of the storage
variables, the only non-linear terms remaining are products of
continuous lower-level dual variables and upper-level binary
variables. These products are linearized using the big-M
approximation method, and the problem reduces to a MILP
approximation of the original non-linear problem.
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